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DOCS / UWA V1 RELEASE CONTRACT SELF-HOSTED GATEWAY

Security model

Direct-dial SSRF protection, secret redaction, loopback metrics and fail-closed governance.

ONE GATEWAYCoordinates → eligible provider → canonical responseWhy UWA
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#Control plane and authentication resilience

Protected capability routes require X-API-Key or Authorization: Bearer authentication with product scopes. Authoritative database lookups enforce a 2-second timeout budget; if PostgreSQL is unreachable, UWA returns a retryable 503 AUTH_BACKEND_UNAVAILABLE (with Retry-After: 1) rather than falsely reporting 401 INVALID_KEY. uapctl is an offline admin CLI so possession of an API key never grants key-creation privileges.

#Outbound SSRF and secret redaction

Outbound provider HTTP clients use direct dialers that verify resolved IP addresses against private/loopback ranges and deliberately ignore ambient HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY environment variables. Cross-origin and HTTPS-to-HTTP redirects are rejected. Upstream query-string API keys (including inside Go url.Error wrappers) are stripped before logging or returning error metadata.

#Metrics and proxy hardening

GET /metrics is disabled by default (APP_METRICS_MODE=off) and can only be enabled on a loopback listener with a ≥32-character APP_METRICS_TOKEN. Client rate limiting ignores X-Forwarded-For unless the immediate peer matches APP_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS (taking the nearest untrusted hop right-to-left). HSTS is emitted only over actual TLS connections.

Canonical contracts: docs/openapi.yaml (lean_v1) and docs/openapi.experimental.yaml · Verify against your build before production use.

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